Power units, called "space batteries," "Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators," or "RTGs," have been in use since the 1960s. The United States uses RTGs to power things that need a reliable source of power in remote locations. Other countries have used them to power things like lighthouses, radio beacons, and weather stations.

The United States uses plutonium-238 to create "general purpose heat sources" to power RTGs. (RTGs can also be powered by other radioactive isotopes.) Pu-238 is different from the plutonium used in nuclear weapons, plutonium-239, in a couple of important ways:

• Pu-238 has a half-life of 88 years; Pu-239 has a half-life of 24,000 years. (Pu-238 decays more rapidly, which is what makes a good heat source for RTGs.)

• Pu-238 does not undergo fission as readily as does Pu-239, making it unsuitable for weapons use.

Pu-238 purchased from Russia has been used to create RTGs to power space exploration, and stockpiled (domestic) Pu-238 has been used for military applications. Agreements with Russia prevent us from using the Pu-238 it sells us for military applications. The domestic stockpile is dwindling, and the demand for Pu-238-powered generators is growing.

The United States now faces a decision: how and where should these batteries be made?

Some steps of the process—the assembly and testing of generator units—already occurs at the Idaho INL site. Production of the units that power the generators, called "general purpose heat units," occurs elsewhere. In January 2001, the federal government decided to resume production of plutonium-238 (Pu-238) to support space exploration. DOE's decision in 2001 selected the Idaho National Laboratory's Advanced Test Reactor, along with an existing reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to restart Pu-238 production.

DOE is now revisiting whether to consolidate all plutonium-238 and power supply production activities at INL, including activities currently performed or planned at national laboratories in Tennessee and New Mexico.

Options for production of RTGs are outlined in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Consolidation of Nuclear Operations Related to Production of Radioisotope Power Systems.

It makes sense for DOE to evaluate reducing shipments and improving operations by consolidating all its battery production activities at INL.

The state needs to be sure that the project will:

• Protect people—both the public and workers—and the environment, from start to finish. DOE has to have clear plans for safely managing and disposing of waste from the project. DOE must plan up front what will happen to facilities at the end of the project. DOE must show how it would improve operations currently conducted at Los Alamos before bringing them to Idaho.

• Ensure DOE meets environmental standards and honors existing commitments for cleanup and waste removal at INL. DOE must earn and retain the trust of the citizens of Idaho if it intends to successfully compete for nuclear projects. Compliance with the agreements it has made with the state of Idaho is a key component of gaining trust.

• Provide for independent oversight. There must be independent oversight of these activities. When the balance between open government and national security favors secrecy, independent oversight and monitoring help protect human health and the environment. DOE has said all activities conducted in Idaho would be subject to independent examination and scrutiny, and we insist those functions be spelled out.

This proposal is an opportunity for Idaho, but we will do our homework to make sure it merits our support.